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GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEm AFFECTED BY THE SECTION
Section 820 of the Revenue Act of 1938 is the first fruits of the
following recommendation by the Subcommittee on Internal Revenue
Taxation of the House Committee on Ways and Means:
"It is recommended that there be prepared suitable provisions
under which the statute of limitations should be so adjusted as to
insure the taxation of income, and the allowance of deductions, in
the year to which properly allocable."'
The statutory section does not exactly carry ot the subcommittee's
recommendation. In some respects it falls short of full compliance with
the mandate; in other respects it extends the principle of the recom-
mendation beyond the precise wording. It is a serious effort to deal
decisively with certain aspects of a very extensive and irritating income
tax question which has so long remained unanswered that many well-
qualified lawyers, administrators, and legislators have come to think it
insoluble.' Any advance toward a sound solution of this problem should
be warmly welcomed; any move in the wrong direction has dangerous
*The final portion of this article, describing the mechanics of § 820 and the classes
of cases to which it applies, will appear in the March issue.
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Although one of the writers, Stanley S. Surrey, is employed by the United States
Treasury Department, the views set forth herein are entirely those of the writers and in
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1. REPORT OF A SUBCONITTEE OF THE COxU TTEE ON WAYS A;D I[EAZ.S 0-1 A
PROPOSED REVISION OF THE REVENUE LAWS, H. R. 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 79, rec-
ommendation No. 48; cf. pp. 54-55.
2. A particularly vigorous attack was made on the problem in 1927. See Revenue
Revision 1927-28, Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and .Mcans, H. R., Interim,
69-70th Congresses, pp. 148-152, 161-162, 302-303, 307-308, 534-535, 544-545, 547-543,
576-577. The speakers were a representative of the Illinois Chamber of Commerce, a
public accountant from Iowa, a representative (Hugh Satterlee) of the Committee on
Federal Taxation of the American Bar Association, and the secretary of a California
Congressman.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
possibilities. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Federal Taxation, in its report to the Sixty-first Annual Meeting of the
Association, expresses unqualified disapproval of Section 820, damning
it by implication as not even embodying a "constructive suggestion", and
strongly urges its repeal.3 With all due respect to the distinguished authors
of this report, the present writers have reached the conclusion that its
treatment of Section 820 is not only inadequate but seriously inaccurate.
The section deserves something better than hasty misjudgment, since it
was "the result of research by Treasury experts and conferences with
members of the bar extending over a period of many months."' 1 The
purpose of this paper is to offer frank and careful analysis and criticism
of the strength and weakness of Section 820. While we are in favor of
the section, and do not pretend to write a merely neutral article, we appre-
ciate the sincerity and strength of some counter-arguments, and feel that
there should be amendatory and supplementary legislation.
As an introductory matter, it is necessary to characterize the field in
which the legislation is intended to operate and to summarize briefly prior
efforts to cope with the difficulties there encountered. By and large, the
situations for which the subcommittee sought relief have appeared in
two general forms. In. the first form, a taxpayer has mistakenly returned
income or mistakenly failed to claim a deduction in a year later closed
by some provision of law, typically the statute of limitations; then, for
another year, the same taxpayer has either been required to return the
same income over again, and pay further tax with respect to it, or has
been denied the benefit of the deduction on the ground that it was allocable
only to the closed year.. In the second form, difficulty has arisen from
uncertainty as to taxpayers rather than as to chronology. For example,
one of two spouses has erroneously included as taxable income an item
which should have been attributed to the other spouse; then the Bureau
of Internal Revenue has discovered the mistake while time still remained
to correct the appropriate return of the second spouse by inserting the
item, but after the statute of limitations has run upon a claim for refund
by the first spouse. It has of course been equally possible for the govern-
ment to suffer in complementary situations taking either form, as where
a single deduction has been used to benefit the same taxpayer in two
different years or to benefit both of two taxpayers whose relationship
caused fiscal confusion. Cases of hardship to taxpayers being thus
matched by cases of hardship to the government, no relief measure can
be truly adequate unless it works both ways.
3. "We recommend that this provision be repealed, and that this connittee cooper-
ate with the Treasury in working out constructive suggestions, looking to the best pos-
sible solution." ADVANCE PROGRAM oF AMERicAN BAR AssocrA~iO , 61st Annual Meeting
(1938) 104.
4. Treasury Press Release No. 14-38, 383 C. C. H. 1938 Fed. Ta.-, Serv. 6502.
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FAILURE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY JUDICLkL ACTIOx
Prior to 1938 legislative proposals had been unavailingly offered to
meet the difficulties outlined in the preceding p-ragraph. Dilemmas in
concept and draftsmanship prevented affirmative action.' Lacking Con-
gressional assistance, the Bureau and taxpayers tried step-by-step methods
of litigation. The principle invoked, to use the broad terms of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, was "that no one should be permitted to found any
claim upon his own inequity or to take advantage of his own wrong."'
In the field of Federal tax procedure this concept, under one name or
another, has done much to prevent technical slip-ups from being fatal to
the government's interests.' Applied to alleviate the effect of errors re-
specting the timing or proprietorship of income or deductions, it has
led to appreciable consequences. Where, for instance, a taxpayer has
claimed the benefit of a deduction for some open year, and investigation
shows that he has already taken the same deduction for another year
which is now closed, the government commonly contends that he has
estopped himself to take the deduction over again in the open year. After
a period of hesitation, the Board of Tax Appeals began to decide such
controversies in the Treasury's favor.8
Turning to cases of a different kind, we find one where a taxpayer
failed to disclose as income constructively received in years prior to 1923
certain items of salary and dividends unqualifiedly credited and made
available to him during those prior years. In 1923 he actually received
the amount of these items, and for that year returned these receipts as
gross income. Then, after the statute of limitations had closed the prior
years, he sought a refund for 1923 on the ground that the items referred
to belonged in the closed earlier years. The Court of Claims denied the
refund; ". . . the plaintiff cannot now . . . be heard to say that such
credits do not constitute taxable income in the year in which he chose
to receive them in a physical sense."' This result is rested on the decision
of a somewhat similar controversy before the Board and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit which really pressed the same principle
further, because the taxpayer in that controversy was resisting a deficiency
instead of seeking a refund.' Deficiencies depend upon cut-and-dried
5. E.g., the discussion and proposals referred to in note 2, supra.
" ,6. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U. S. 54, 61 (1934).
7. 'Maguire and Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation
(1935) 48 HARv. L. REi. 1281, passim; 5 PA.L AND M3%RTENs, L.w OF FEDE.AL INcOAE
TAXATION §§ 53.02 et seq. (1938 Curn. Supp.).
8. The cases are reviewed in Firemen's Insurance Co., 30 B. T. A. 1004, 1011-1013
(1934). See Stern Brothers v. United States, 80 Ct. CIs. 223. 8 F. Supp. 705 (1934);
Giant Furniture Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cis. 540, 9 F. Supp. 585 (1935).
9. Raleigh v. United States, 78 Ct. Cis. 653, 663, 5 F. Supp. 6M, 027 (1934).
10. Estate of Thomas J. Moran, 26 B. T. A. 1154 (1932), aff'd, Moran v. Commis-
sioner, 67 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933); see Walter L. Ross, 30 B. T. A. 495, 501
(1934); Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F. (2d) 35, 37 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935).
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technical tax law; refunds rest upon equitable principles. Equity is more
touchy about unconscionable behavior.11 In a related case the taxpayer
was a lessor; his lessee erected improvements on the demised premises;
the taxpayer never returned any gross income on account of this accession
in value. Seven years after completion of the improvements he sold his
interest in the premises and, when reporting the sale for income tax,
claimed as part of his basis the depreciated value of the improvements.
The Commissioner rejected this increase of basis, imposed a deficiency,
and won the case.
12
Most famous of all the government's victories in this connection is
Stone v. White,13 where the issue was "whether . . . testamentary
trustees, who have paid a tax on the income of the trust estate, which
should have been paid by the beneficiary, are entitled to recover the tax,
although the government's claim against the beneficiary has been barred
by the statute of limitations." Recovery was refused, the successful
defense being described as a denial of the trustees' "equitable right to
undo a payment which, though effected by an erroneous procedure, has
resulted in no unjust enrichment to the government, and in no injury
to [the trustees] or their beneficiary", the beneficiary being the only
person who would have been in pocket by the refund.
Winning these cases was a real achievement by government counsel,
but their decisions cover only a thin scattering of the situations con-
stantly encountered. This fact so abundantly appears from our later
discussion that no elaborate detail is offered here. It is enough to indicate
the limits upon, and various qualifications of, the decisions just set forth.
If, in Stone v. White, neither beneficiary nor trustees had ever paid the
tax voluntarily, the trustees having duly taken a deduction for their
payment of income to the beneficiary, it seems highly doubtful whether
an attempt to deny this deduction by asserting a deficiency against the
trustees, after the statute had run in favor of the beneficiary, would have
succeeded. In a later case where other trustees apparently should have
paid, but unquestionably did not pay, tax with respect to certain receipts,
and no part of those receipts was ever passed on to the beneficiary, the
latter, having erroneously paid tax with respect to the receipts, recovered
his payment after the statute had run in favor of the trustees.14 Where
an income beneficiary should have paid tax, but did not, and fiduciaries
11. Schmidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F. (2d) 680, 683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). But see
Crawford v. Heiner, 23 F. Supp. 240, 241 (W. D. Pa., 1938).
12. William Merriam Crane, 27 B. T. A. 360 (1932), aff'd, Crane v. Commissioner,
68 F. (2d) 640 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934). Here, of course, there is a fundamental problem
as to whether and when lessees' improvements constitute taxable income to lessors. This
problem is aside from the immediate discussion. See Blatt Co. v. United States, 59 Sup.
Ct. 186 (U. S. 1938).
13. 301 U. S. 532, 533, 539 (1937).
14. Lyman v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 14 (D. Mass., 1938).
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should have claimed a corresponding deduction, but failed to do so, it
was held that the running of the statute in favor of the beneficiary did
not prevent recovery of the fiduciaries' overpayment by the remainderman
to whom the trust corpus had ultimately been distributed.",
With respect to the lessee improvement situation in which the lessor
was not allowed to augment his basis by the value of the improvement,
because he had paid no income tax on account of its acquisition, we find
the effect of the case in some degree weakened by the tone of a later
United States Supreme Court opinion"0 and by the actual decisions of
later cases in the lower Federal courts. There is a tendency to offer
specialized explanations for the lessee improvement result and also for
the two constructive receipt cases described above in the same connec-
tion.'" The government's most common formula in these matters has
been that taxpayers are "estopped". In fact, it would not be seriously
misleading to term this part of our exposition a discussion of the practical
consequences of the estoppel theory. With increasing frequency the courts
point out that no estoppel can be found where all facts have been honestly
15. Sewell v. United States, 85 Ct. Cis. 512, 524, 19 F. Supp. 657, 663 (1937); cf.
Schlemmer v. United States, 94 F. (2d) 77, 78 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), where the court
could not tell who would have borne increased tax burden if an improper deduction had
not been taken; and said, moreover, "we do not believe that the eventual incidence of the
tax which has been lost, may be traced back, however indirectly, to the taxpayer in
court so that his recovery shall be diminished pro tanto." Contrast Smith ,. United
States, 22 F. Supp. 1011, 1015 (E. D. Pa., 1938), where the remaindermen inherited
from the life tenant as well as from the creator of the trust.
16. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 U. S. 106, 109 (1936), where the taxpayer disclosed
in his return for 1922 no gain from certain profitable acquisition and exchange transac-
tions during that year, but in connection with a partial closing out of his investment in
1929 resisted a deficiency by asserting a basis enhanced on account of the 1922 transac-
tions. The lower court, says the opinion, held "that the failure to disclose 1922 taxable
gain apparently resulted from innocent mistake of law; there was no false representa-
tion of fact; nothing gave support to the claim of estoppel." And the defense of estoppel
not having been properly raised, "the court should have passed the point. Furllcrmnore,
the facts disclosed give it iw support." (Italics added).
17. United States v. Dickinson, 95 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) ; Schmidlapp Y.
Commissioner, 96 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Helvering v. Williams, 97 F. (2d)
810 (C. C.A. 8th, 1938); R. E. Baker, 37 B.T.A. 1135, 1152, (1933); see Com-
missioner v. Farren, 82 F. (2d) 141, 143 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), cert. granlcd, 293 U. S.
653 (1936), but dismissed on stipulation 299 U. S. 617 (1936), where the confusion of
cases made the court doubtful; E. R. Hawke, 35 B. T. A. 784, 792 (1937). Contrast
Alamo National Bank of San Antonio, 36 B. T. A., 402, 405-407 (1937), aff'd, 95 F.
(2d) 622 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), ccrt. denied, 304 U. S. 577 (1938).
18. See cases cited supra note 17; Steele Estate, 34 B. T. A. 173, 176 (1936), ex-
plaining the Moran and Raleigh cases as illustrations of election, and the Crane case as
involving "a failure to disclose facts which amounts to a misrepresentation of facts"; cf.
Sugar Creek Coal & Mining Co., 31 B. T. A. 344, 348, n. 2 (1934) ; Grauman's Greater
Hollywood Theatre, Inc., 37 B. T. A. 449 (1938); Commissioner v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., 86 F. (2d) 637, 639 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936). Contrast Sugar Creek Coal & Mining
Co., 30 B. T. A. 420, 423 (1934).
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disclosed to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or-this being probably an
alternative wording of the same idea-where the taxpayer's erroneous
conduct finds its sole basis in a mistake of law (or of "mixed law and
fact") contemporaneously shared by the Bureau. The concept of "estop-
pel" is quite intricate. With a few standardized exceptions, such as
estoppel by deed, cases in which this concept is claimed to apply present
individual problems. Nothing could show this more vividly than the
variations of facts, arguments, and results in the many Federal estoppel
controversies, and the consequent extreme difficulty in classification.1"
The whole estoppel situation makes for dubiousness very unfitting to
tax law. Citizen and Bureau alike should be able to find their legal
positions more clearly and broadly forecast.
Some criticisms of estoppel and related remedies in this connection are
themselves subjects of controversy. It is said, for instance, that estoppel
is objectionable because it freezes or perpetuates an error instead of setting
matters aright according to the substantive requirements of the tax laws.
Where a taxpayer ten years ago wrongly took a deduction which he
should be taking now, it is truer to Congressional desires to open up and
correct the decade-old return, than to fix the mistake immutably by an
estoppel respecting the current year. But other critics vigorously take
Section 820 to task because it embodies this very view. Orderly develop-
ment of our topics demands postponement of such contested points. One
fundamental objection to estoppel and the like as an exclusive cure, how-
ever, is open to no contest. Estoppel is hopelessly lop-sided. For reasons
well enough understood, whether they be good or bad, it is practically
impossible, or at least very difficult, for the taxpayer to make an estoppel
operate against the government.20 So in the main he who erroneously
paid tax on supposed income for a year subsequently closed has had no
hope of relief when, prior to the effective date of Section 820, he has
been called upon to pay over again for the technically correct year. Neither
has he had a better hope if, in connection with a capital transaction, he
has tried to build into his basis a sum erroneously taxed as income.2 1
The nearest approach to a taxpayer's success in any such case occurred
under most unusual circumstances when, by virtue of the doctrine of
recoupment, a deficiency collected on an open income-tax item was reduced
and ordered partly refunded because of an erroneous and inconsistent
estate tax payment made in connection with another aspect of the same
19. Grand Central Public Market, Inc. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 119, 126 el seq.
(S. D. Cal., 1938), contains an instructive review of the cases and allows recovery of an
overpayment traceable to the return of income in the wrong year, despite the closing
of the right years.
20. See Maguire and Zimet, supra note 7, at 1299 ct seq.; PAUL AND MERTENS, Op.
cit. supra note 7, §§ 53.07, 53.11, 53.12 (1938 Cum. Supp.).
21. Bigelow v. Bowers, 68 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.
656 (1934).
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asset in a year which had been closed.22 This peculiar case does not aid
the broad situation and leaves the purely judicial remedy condemned as
inadequate under the test stated at the dose of the preceding section.
Working often against, and never, or substantially never, for, the tax-
payer, prosecution of this remedy was sure to cause growing resentment
unless justly supplemented or replaced. Enactment of some legislative
relief has become more emphatically imperative with each passing year.
REASONS FOR SPECIALIZED TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Before proceeding to discuss the nature of possible legislative remedies
and of the particular remedy actually afforded by Section 820, it is neces-
sary to deal with a fundamental question hitherto put aside with tacit
assumption of a favorable answer. What warrants specialized treatment
of cases such as those which have been indicated? Mention of hardslip
and financial loss is unconvincing. The world at large, and the income-
tax world in particular, are full of hardship and loss despite which it is
deemed sound policy to enforce general rules inflexibly. Our Federal
income-tax is already most intricate and every additional complexity
demands clear affirmative justification. Indeed, the present modification
occurs at a particularly sensitive spot in the administrative plan. Probably
no informed person would deny the general desirability of a statute of
limitations in connection with the Federal income-tax. The classical
justifications for such laws apply well enough in this particular area.
Speaking of possessory actions respecting real property, Blackstone says
"there is a time of limitation settled, beyond which no man shall avail
himself of the possession of himself or his ancestors, or take advantage
of the wrongful possession of his adversary. For, if he be negligent for
a long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to lend him any
assistance, to recover the possession merely, both to punish his neglect
. . . and also because it is presumed that the supposed wrongdoer has
in such a length of time procured a legal title, otherwise he would sooner
have been sued."23 The great commentator does not here explain the rea-
sons for the presumption, but suggests them at a later point, where he is
talking about personal actions: "The use of these statutes of limitation
is to preserve the peace of the kingdom, and to prevent those innumerable
perjuries which might ensue, if a man were allowed to bring an action
for any injury committed at any distance of time."24 Speaking more
exactly of the Federal income-tax, we deem it self-manifest on the
government side that without the aid of periods of limitation the Bureau
of Internal Revenue might become so hopelessly involved in old contro-
22. Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247 (1935).
23. 3 BL Coum., c. X.
24. Id., c. XX.
19391
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versies as to make its dealings with instant problems nowhere near cur-
rent. On the taxpayers' side, statutes of limitation give at least rough
assurance that demands for tax will usually not lag too far behind receipt
of income from which payment may be made.
Now it is true that taxpayers, Bureau, and courts have with remarkable
unanimity sought some modification of the rigidity of periods of limita-
tion in the present connection. But even to a complaisant legislature
mere general demand can furnish only an inadequate standard of action.
Technical administrative provisions of tax laws should be soundly ex-
plicable; besides, legislation cannot be effective or even safe until the
causes of demands for it have been explored to determine how far relief
should be carried. Hence we examine critically the explanations officially
offered for the action of Congress in passing Section 820. The House
Subcommittee, already quoted, backed its recommendation by saying that
existing rulings and decisions "often permit taxpayers or the Commis-
sioner to obtain a two-fold advantage by assuming in one year a position
different from that taken in another year with respect to which the period
of limitations has expired, so that adjustment of the tax liability for the
earlier year is impossible. The sole purpose of the statute of limitations
is to prevent the. litigation of stale claims. Its use to obtain a two-fold
advantage, whether by double deduction or double taxation, is not in
keepirig with its fundamental purpose.
' ' 5
This employment of the terms "two-fold" and "double" naturally stig-
gests the necessity of special relief because unusually serious financial
consequences are involved. The suggestion is fallacious. Assuming the
same taxable gross income, it costs the government not one cent more to
have a taxpayer (a) take a deduction twice, once erroneously and once
correctly, than it does to have the same taxpayer (b) take a completely
unauthorized deduction once and once only. Likewise, the taxpayer is no
more deeply out of pocket for having (a) to include the same item in
gross income, once erroneously and once correctly, in two taxable years,
than for having (b) to include in one year alone an item not properly
taxable at all. But no seasoned tax man would seriously propose special
tinkering of the statute of limitations to relieve the victims of the (b)
cases above.
The term "double" has another possible connotation, namely that of
duplicity. This is suggested in the first part of the foregoing quotation
from the Subcommittee report, and appears again in the Statement of
the House Managers following the conference: "Under the income-tax
laws it is possible for a taxpayer or the Commissioner, after operation
of the statute of limitations or some other provision of the internal-
revenue laws prevents correction of an error, to obtain a double advantage
25. Op. cit. supra note 1, at 54-55.
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by taking a position contradictory to that which caused the error."20 But
the idea of misrepresentation, followed by something in the nature of an
estoppel or reparation, will not explain nearly all the cases in which relief
against the rigidity of the statute of limitations has been felt desirable.
Sometimes, but only sometimes, it is determinative. We feel certain that
some situations in which all the actors had behaved with entire frankness
would give rise to loud demands for special amelioration. Imagine, for
instance, that under a view of law honestly shared by taxpayer and Com-
missioner tax has been paid with respect to an item supposed to be income
for an earlier year, the statute of limitations has closed that year against
refund, the Supreme Court has unexpectedly announced a different rule
controlling the situation, and under that rule a second tax has had to
be exacted for a later year with respect to the same item. 7 If we wish
a truly comprehensive justification for specialized provisions in this con-
nection, we must look beyond notions of deception. Also, talk of duplicity
inevitably involves some implication of bad moral tone. Surely it is no
worse morally to take a deduction ahead of time in 1938 and again at
the proper time in 1940, than to claim as a deduction in either year some
expense or loss not covered by the deduction sections of the statute.
But "double" or "duplicate" does supply a significant clue to one ex-
planation of the demand which gave rise to Section 820. In each of
these "two-fold" cases concerning insertion of an item first in a closed
year and second in an open year, the correspondence of issues and evidence
as to both present and past eliminates the reasons behind provisions for
periods of limitation. Stale claims are bad because the passage of time
obscures the facts about them. Witnesses die, witnesses forget, other
evidence is lost, the check on perjury disappears. They are bad because
they force men who would defend against them to delve in the past and
thus fall behind a progressing world. They are bad because, if sustained,
they impose upon these men crippling liabilities. But as to categories of
old claims not subject to these condemnations, the legislature may wisely
make exceptions to the rules of limitation.28
26. I. R.REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 56.
27. Bigelow v. Bowers, cited supra note 21, is not far from this situation, and the
dissenter in the Circuit Court of Appeals plainly e.xpressed his indignation. Consider
also the long drawn out episode as to the placement of tax when a widow is beneficiary
of a trust under her dead husband's will, which episode culminated in Stone t. Thidle,
discussed supra, p. 512.
28. The importance of the considerations here suggested by our text deserves double
emphasis. Much criticism of § M20 has been based on the sanctity of statutes of limita-
tions. Thus Percy W. Phillips, an eminent practitioner: "But the fundamental error of
this statute, as I see it, which requires that it should be repealed and a new start made
rather than an attempt made to amend the section is the provision which requires that
the statute of limitations be removed on years which are dosed. That idea seems fun-
damentally wrong. Statutes of repose are necessary; business cannot be run without
statutes of repose. They should not be removed nor enlarged after they have expired."
(1938) 16 TAx MAG. at 694. Has Mr. Phillips paused adequately to consider the funda-
1939]
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It is possible to assert reasonably that we deal here with such a category,
as examples easily demonstrate. If the Commissioner has for 1933 taxed
an officer of a corporation on the ground that stock received by the officer
from the corporation in that year was an item of compensation, and then
in 1938, when the officer sells the stock, reverses himself by insisting that
the stock was a gift to the officer, and refuses to allow the 1933 value as
a basis, he has or ought to have the full facts in hand. Indeed, his very
action seems an admission that he has reviewed the first tax and found
it erroneous. On principle, he is in no position to meet the taxpayer's
demand for some sort of adjustment or allowance as to that first payment
with the reply that this means digging up long-buried dry bones or unduly
interfering with the currency of tax administration. The antiquarian job,
he necessarily asserts, has already been done, the adequate evidence col-
lected and appraised. As to having funds to make the adjustment, the
Commissioner proposes to put himself in pocket by the impending de-
ficiency assessment. And so, of course, if some taxpayer deducts for a
bad debt in his 1934 return and repeats the deduction in his 1938 return
on the ground that he timed it wrongly to begin with, he has little excuse
for whimpering about being made to pay up too late if the Commissioner
seeks a deficiency for 1934. In neither of these situations can the litigant
who has precipitated trouble by seizing an advantage in the open year
appeal to any of the reasons underlying rules of limitations. He who seeks
repose should practice it by letting sleeping dogs lie.
The specialized arguments just made for inapplicability of the ordinary
rules of limitations apply, it will be observed, only where the party who
takes the offensive is the one against whom, if he had remained passive,
enforcement of the stale demand would have been prevented. Turn either
case the other way about, and the consequences are entirely different. If
the corporate officer finds that he will save money by getting back his
tax for 1933 and taking a lower or zero basis for 1938, the Commissioner
can conscientiously stand his ground on the statute of limitations and
say: "I am not called upon to search old files, resurrect dead witnesses
or try the hazy memory of forgetful ones, or spend the Bureau's time
and money over buried issues." The taxpayer in the second case, assum-
ing he has treated the deduction as over and done with when used in
1934, may properly respond likewise if the Bureau tries to force the de-
duction on him for 1938 and collect a deficiency by taking it away for
1934. These are neither more nor less than the "(b) cases" referred to
on a previous page.29 Section 820 carefully respects this distinction by
mental reasons for statutes of limitations, and the possibility that they may be inapplicable
here? Our own respect for wise periods of limitations is, we hope, as great as his. But
blind worship of a legal institution is very dangerous both to the community and to the
institution itself. Injustice results when even the wisest doctrine is pressed beyond its
proper application, and obstinate persistence in such excess may cause a damaging rebellion
against the doctrine as a whole.
29. P. 516, mtpra.
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refusing to open a closed year except for reversal of position by the party
whom the closing would otherwise safeguard.
While we consider the fundamental reason for special legislation in the
immediate connection to be the one just explained, some subsidiary con-
siderations point toward the same conclusion. The courts rather often
assert that a taxpayer who claims a deduction in a certain year, or even
a taxpayer who fails to return a possible income item in a certain year,
is making a representation as to the propriety of his getting the deduction
or the impropriety of charging him with tax respecting the income for
the particular fiscal period. Present judicial tendencies seem, as noted
above, to be toward arguing thus only where a representation of "fact"
can be found.3" But the idea can surely be enlarged to cover a representa-
tion as to the practical effect of a whole situation. If the Bureau accepts
the return, it manifests reliance upon the representation as meaning in
the first case that the claim of deduction will not be repeated or in the
second that the income is to be returned for some other year. Whenever
such a taxpayer repudiates or retracts his representation and, because
limitations have closed the original year, succeeds in avoiding any sort
of counterclaim or offset against the saving thus realized, he has put the
statute of limitations to an unintended and improper use. It serves not
merely as a shield to protect his passivity when threatened with a tardily
asserted liability, but as part of his offensive apparatus in an active at-
tempt to profit at the Treasury's expense.3  Whether this contention
applies fully to a case in which the government has received and retained
erroneously paid tax for an earlier year, and later seeks to enforce a tech-
nically correct tax respecting the same item in a later year, is by no means
certain. Bearing in mind the great mass of cases which the Bureau must
handle in any taxable year, it is at least excusable and perhaps essential
that many really doubtful points should be passed over untested. That
is, merely accepting a return and a check in payment of the indicated tax
can scarcely be considered in every instance as a representation that all
items have been scrutinized and finally approved. Here, however, it is
necessary to remember that the taxpaying constituency will demand what
seems to it symmetrical justice, and that advocacy of adjustment where
a deduction has been twice claimed will cause indignant reaction unless
it includes a corresponding possibility where income has been twice taxed.
The suggestion just'offered about the impracticability of a complete
annual official check-up of returns has, however, definite significance in
30. Pp. 513-4, siupra.
31. The'leading case of Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S. 578, 579, 580-581 (ISSO),
involved defenses based upon both the statute of limitations and estoppel. Mr. Justice
Swayne said that the court's "remarks will be confined to the point of estoppel ....
It [estoppel] is available only for protection, and cannot be used as a weapon of assault
. . . It is akin to the principle involved in the limitation of actions, and does its work
of justice and repose where the statute cannot be invoked."
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another aspect. It is clear enough that successful administration of in-
come-tax laws depends largely upon the government's ability to minimize
the detective work required to discover concealed items. Further, suc-
cessful administration is much more likely if the quantity of litigation
can be held down. An unyielding statute of limitations, with risks of
uncompensated second taxes on debatably-timed income, discourages frank,
early disclosure of such income. Thus it tends to compel more govern-
mental detective work, and of course it compels prompt litigation by tax-
payers against whose .claims administrative rulings are made. Adminis-
tration should be easier with the backing of statutory assurance that, if
first impressions are reversed in the light of later examination and expe-
rience, corrective adjustments extending to the entire transaction will
become possible. Furthermore, this same assurance, operating with respect
to debatably-timed deductions, would reduce the necessity of obstinate
contests by the Commissioner in connection with the initial making of
deduction claims.
Down to this point no explicit attempt has been made to justify on
principle a special modification of the statute of limitations in cases where
the proprietorship, instead of the proper timing, of income or deductions
is in doubt. All the argument of the preceding paragraph clearly applies
to such situations. As to the antecedent arguments, their application is
also clear and easy whenever the government seeks two or several taxes
from two or more taxpayers with respect to the same item of income, or
successively denies to tvo or more taxpayers the benefit of a deduction
which certainly belongs to one of the pair or group. The same sort of
culpable retraction of a representation and of misuse of the statute of
limitations can be found. But when the error is costly, instead of profit-
able, to the Commissioner and its rectification involves making taxpayer
A render compensation for the success of taxpayer B, our problem has
plainly become complicated by a new consideration. Why, to put the
matter more specifically, should A be deprived of the normal benefit of
the statute of limitations simply because he and a separate person B have
both taken advantage of a deduction properly attributable to B alone?
Where this description is complete, and no other relevant fact appears,
we do not believe that a special modification of the principle of limitation
of actions can be justified. Addition of other factors, though, may proper-
ly change the conclusion. For example, if A has put himself in a position
of vicarious responsibility, as by concocting and executing with B a scheme
to trick the government into a double allowance, it will not be hard to
justify a device for stripping A of the statutory shelter and compelling
him to set matters straight. So, too, where A is the beneficiary of B's
success, as in trustee-life tenant cases. Upon these fundamental situa-
tions for exceptional treatment Section 820 has elaborated with the idea
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of "related taxpayers". Whether this idea covers too much or too little
ground is left for later discussion.
The recommendation of the Subcommittee quoted at the opening of
this paper suggests that only the statute of limitations gives rise to the
kind of controversy under discussion. In fact, several other provisions
of the internal-revenue laws, and some more general principles of legis-
lation or of judicial decision, such as rcs judicata, accomplish or appear
to accomplish similar results. Examples derived from the internal-revenue
laws include (a) the collateral effects of petitions.to the Board of Tax
Appeals in preventing further deficiency letters, or credits or refunds;
(b) statutory closing agreements; (c) tax compromises; and (d) pro-
visions barring voluntary, as distinguished from compelled, refunds or
credits after the periods of limitations have expiredY2  So far as the
underlying reasons for existence of these restrictive provisions resemble
the reasons underlying the ordinary action of the statute of limitations,
the preceding discussion applies equally well to them. Where different
reasons control or additional considerations color the picture, the con-
clusions as to modification of such statutory or common law provisions
in the present connection may vary from those put forward above. Here
again is a topic better postponed than treated fully at this point.
The conclusions from this particular part of our discussion are that
there is justification for specialized legislative treatment of the types of
controversies being considered, so far as each controversy involves but
one taxpayer; that this justification extends within limits to such con-
troversies involving two or more taxpayers; and that it also extends to
a number of restrictive principles different from but allied with the
statute of limitations. Our next and final preliminary task, before taking
up in detail the content of Section 820, is to sketch in broad general terms
the various possible lines or philosophies of legislative attack upon the
problem which the section might have followed.
POSSIBLE GENERAL LINES OF LEGISLATIVE
ATTACK UPON THE PROBLEM
Suppose taxpayer A erroneously returns as income in 1933 a sum of
$1,000 and pays for that year $150 more income-tax than if he had
omitted the item. In 1938 the item actually becomes taxable, the Bureau
discovers it, and A is called upon to pay a consequent deficiency of
$300 for 1938. Meanwhile, the statute of limitations has run against
a refund for 1933. Rectification might be accomplished in any one of
several ways:
32. See Regulations prescribed with respect to §820, especially Art. SZO(b)-O.
Regulations 101, Appendix, T. D. 4856.
1939]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
First, by application in the taxpayer's favor of a statutory estoppel
theory which freezes the mistake into permanent acceptability. The result
will be that by paying $150 for 1933, A escapes a liability of $300 for
1938. Even allowing for five years' interest (or discount), this result is
calculated to make A quite happy. It is calculated to sadden the Commis-
sioner and the community, for A has avoided paying his full share of
the price of civilization. But if the tax figures are reversed-$300 for
1933 and $150 for 1938-and the same freezing principle applied, A
will be very unhappy- To be sure, he escapes a double payment, but the
tax paid in error greatly exceeds the theoretically correct tax. Yet the
government retains the whole payment.
Second, by application in the taxpayer's favor of a theory of recoup-
ment. In the case first put, he will have $150 plus interest applied to
reduce the $300 deficiency,' and will have to pay the remainder with new
money. This result seems beyond criticism. It accurately carries out the
tax obligation which Congress imposed upon A. Reverse the figures once
more, however, and we get a result unsatisfactory to A in precisely the
same degree and for the same reasons as in the reversal under the estoppel
theory.
Third, by application in the taxpayer's favor of a rule that this situa-
tion must be comprehensively adjusted so that A will pay no more and
no less than the theoretically correct amount of tax (and interest) re-
specting the contested item. Here, no matter in which order the smaller
and larger tax payments are put, A ends up by having paid exactly what
is found to have been required by statute, and with respect to the right
year. There has been no undeservedly lucky escape and no unlucky sub-
jection to disproportionate burden.
An additional factor may be made to affect the result under either
the second or the third method. Change the original hypothesis by imag-
ining that, although A's tax return for 1933 shows only an overpayment
of $150 by inclusion of the doubtful item, he has failed to claim a loss
of $1,500 properly deductible in the same return. Had this loss been
claimed, his tax would have shrunk another $200. Should the taxable
year 1933 be opened up completely, so that this second error is taken into
account as well as the first? If the answer be affirmative, A would, under
the recoupment theory, pay nothing at all on the deficiency asserted for
1938; and under the third or accurate correction theory he would actually
receive a net refund representing $50 plus interest, probably for some-
what more than five years, on his 1933 overpayment of $350.
Section 820 has in fact adopted the accurate correction method, and
rejected consideration of the additional factor just described. Much of
the adverse criticism by the American Bar Association's Standing Com-
mittee on Federal Taxation is directed toward both of these fundamental
points. The Committee's report says that the method "proceeds on the
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unreliable assumption that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whenever
it takes a position inconsistent with something it has done in an earlier
year, is conscious of such inconsistency, and likewise that taxpayers are
conscious of their inconsistencies"; and since "the new liability for the
reopened year may involve a much larger sum in tax than was involved
for the open year" the method "requires reaudits for years with vhich
the Government Departments have finished." Also: "By making it risky
for a taxpayer to file claims for refund . . . it induces taxpayers to
exercise the greatest care never to overpay-a state of mind which creates
new and difficult problems for the taxation authorities." Then, striking
at the refusal by Congress completely to open the taxable year in which
the foundation of the inconsistency was laid, "it may involve a much
larger sum in tax as to the reopened year than would be indicated for that
reopened year on a complete and correct recalculation as to that year."'
An appealing illustration for the last contention is: Taxpayer A for 1933
claims a deduction of $1,000 to which he will not legally be entitled
until 1938; this reduces his taxable income to zero; therefore he does
not take the trouble to claim another and immediately legitimate deduc-
tion of $500; for 1938 he again claims the $1,000 deduction; his in-
consistency is discovered and he is subjected to a deficiency assessment
for 1933 which discards his erroneously taken $1,000 deduction but gives
him no benefit for the potentially valuable $500 deduction.
None of the foregoing criticisms seems to deny the theoretical sound-
ness of the proposition that if erroneous treatment of an income item
or a deduction is to be corrected, the correction should produce the same
result as if the error had never been made. The contention seems to be
that income-tax administration cannot be operated upon purely ideal
hypotheses. Practical difficulties must have recognition. The suggestions
of such difficulties made above amount to a collective assertion that inade-
quate protection is afforded by the rule, which Section 820 has adopted,
of refusing to open a closed year unless the party who takes the offensive
by claiming a deduction, seeking a refund, asserting a deficiency, or
otherwise "is the one against whom, if he had remained passive, enforce-
ment of the stale demand would have been prevented."" There is, says
the Committee, too much risk that the inconsistent party will move in
ignorance of his inconsistency and find himself trapped, at least unless
he exercises inordinate pains to safeguard his steps.
Take first the counter-argument with respect to the government. Re-
audits for closed years, which the Committee mentions as raising a
problem, are necessary whenever the Bureau puts forward the familiar
contention that a taxpayer is estopped by something lie did in a year
33. Ot. cit. supra note 3, at 106. The Committee makes its various points in an
order somewhat different from that followed above.
34. See p. 518, mupra.
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now beyond reach of correction. The auditing problem has never, ap-
parently, proved an insurmountable or even a serious barrier in such
litigation. Requiring a reaudit of one or more earlier years to protect
the government's interests when a decision is being made about assertion
of a deficiency involving items which may affect such years as well as
the immediate year should commend itself to taxpayers, if such require-
ment be practicable. The Bureau is often criticized for attacking situa-
tions without first surveying them comprehensively, thus subjecting citi-
zens to extended series of annoyances and demands which might have
been consolidated. As to practicability, the Bureau replied affirmatively,
while Section 820 was before Congress, when asked if it would be able
to do the necessary reauditing. It seems possible that the perils to the
Treasury outlined in the quoted passages are meant to give outward
symmetry to an argument at bottom solely for the taxpayers' interests.
Of course, if the argument is sound and just, it should be none the
less acceptable because one-sided. But the Committee makes no specifica-
tions as to undue risk imposed upon taxpayers. Why is not A in a dilemma
if he claims a deduction for 1938 and, faced with evidence that he errone-
ously took the same deduction for 1933, answers that the situation should
continue unrectified because he has forgotten all about 1933 or never
knew of his claim with respect to that year? Either his affairs are simple,
in which case forgetfulness or ignorance is unreasonable, or his affairs
are complicated, in which case it is scarcely unjust to say that he or his
lawyers or accountants should check over what has been done in past
returns before claiming a benefit from the government in the present
return. The Committee's argument has not been cordially received by
the courts or the Board of Tax Appeals in estoppel cases of this type."
It seems even less convincing where basis in capital transactions is in-
volved, for here the ascertaining of basis implies a search of the past,
and conscientious men, making such search, do not come back with only
the profitable facts, neglecting the unprofitable ones. We venture the
assertion that if substantial numbers of double deduction cases and anal-
ogous basis cases were fully analyzed, it would be found that the ultimate
inconsistent positions had generally been taken not because of ignorance
but because of acute advice from lawyers or accountants who knew per-
fectly well the whole genesis and development of the situations. It is
highly pertinent to reassert the taxpayer's duty of reasonable care to the
United States in making his income-tax returns, because that duty, ade-
quately discharged, will nearly always warn him of self-inconsistency.
Nor, it may be added, is correction of these inconsistency situations under
the third method a matter of onerous and unjust penalty, even when
there is exacted "a much larger sum in tax than was involved for the
open year." That sum represents simply an amount by which 'the tax-
35. Cf. note 8, supra.
[Vol. 48: 509
SECTION 820 OF THE REVIENUE ACT
payer concerned failed initially to bear his share of the common burden.
The last assertion seems to be specially challenged by the Committee
on the gr-ound that Section 820 does not provide complete recomputation
of tax for the reopened year. While the section was being shaped, pre-
cisely the reverse argument prevailed. In Lewis v. Reynolds, " it will be
remembered, a taxpayer to whom a certain deduction had been improperly
denied was refused a refund because, after the running of the statute
of limitations, the Commissioner discovered and relied upon an im-
proper deduction taken with respect to the same tax, which improper
deduction more than counterbalanced the one that should have been
permitted. This principle, if inserted in Section 820, and enforced by
ingenious and determined reauditing might be employed to block most
refunds unless taxpayers were willing to carry their litigation out of
the Bureau and into the courts. WNrhether any such use would actually
be made of the principle is rather beside the point. Many taxpayers,
lawyers, and accountants would have thought the risk substantial enough
to detract seriously from the merits of the legislation. The American
Bar Association's Committee would scarcely have failed to take that side
of the argument.
So far as the omission or mistreatment of other items in the reopened
year is unconnected with the item involved in the inconsistency, the
reasons for specialized modification of the statute of limitations do not
extend to them. Hence on principle there is good ground for refusing
to reopen as to such items.37 Of course this involves distinct departure
from the concept that income-tax liability for each year is a unitary mat-
ter, not to be split into subordinate fractions. The Bar Association Com-
mittee, however, seems to us to speak soundly when it says: "Statutes
of repose are based on such practical reasons that exceptions should be
rare and should be close limited in their effect."' (Italics supplied.) 3
Precisely this consideration justifies close limitation by the unusual pro-
cedure of splitting liability in the present unusual situation. So far as
omission or mistreatment of items in the reopened year is connected with
the item involved in the inconsistency, different considerations apply. One
possible example has been given in the form of a deduction omitted be-
cause it seemed superfluous, as the original return for the reopened year
disclosed no tax liability. Special provision might be made for such situa-
tions. It should be borne in mind, however, that they will ordinarily
involve comparatively slight tax burdens because the operation of such
deductions, if duly asserted, would as a rule be only to reduce or cancel
liability for normal tax. Few individuals, surely, fail to report deductions
36. 284 U. S. 281 (1932).
37. Report of the Senate Conintittee on Finance, SE:.. REp. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. (1938) 51-52.
38. Op. cit. snpra note 3. at 106.
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as large as $4,000 and the requirements of corporation returns are such
that this kind of omission will not occur. Then, too, reasonably careful
individual taxpayers, working with Section 820 in mind, will not from
now on make these omissions but will set out the whole story. Conse-
quently the risk of any injustice from this cause will steadily decrease
as old returns are finally disposed of, and is likely to be negligible with
respect to situations relevant to tax returns made after the middle of
1938. Unless and until experience demonstrates otherwise, it would seem
sound to avoid complicating this part of the Revenue Acts with a special
protective clause. In weighing this conclusion, the reader should remember
that the Commissioner will never be able to collect additional tax for a
closed year under Section 820 except when inconsistent action on the
taxpayer's side clears the way for reopening. He should also note that
the foregoing remarks deal with other items, whether related or unrelated
to the items directly involved in inconsistencies. They do not deal with
computations based upon items, either singly or in the aggregate. Cor-
rection of the erroneous treatment of one item may have far-reaching
consequences in diverse computations. That problem is discussed here-
after.
We regard as extremely important the effect of any tax provision upon
the willingness of taxpayers to make payments without goading by the
collecting authorities. It seems plain beyond argument that the Federal
income-tax cannot continue to function successfully unless the bulk of
the revenue receipts from it are paid in voluntarily. In a preceding section
of this article the point is made that statutory assurance of correction
in case of mistake will encourage voluntary tax payments. But the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Committee report asserts that the particular kind
of assurance given by Section 820 will cause taxpayers to minimize their
voluntary payments because of the risks involved in claims for refund
that may conceivably disclose inconsistencies and open up remote years
to damaging recomputations of tax.
Stated in these general terms the contention has a delusive suggestion
of importance which rapidly fades out when concrete, practical terms are
substituted. To begin with, most items involved in income-tax returns
are clear both as to timing and proprietorship. By no reasonable flight
of imagination can it be assumed that willingness to make due disclosure
of, and pay tax with respect to, these items will decrease because cor-
rective machinery exists exclusively applicable to items of an entirely
different nature.
So far as doubtful items or plainly mishandled items are concerned,
claims for refund create risk of the reopening of closed years in only
two situations. First, a taxpayer who seeks a refund as to an open year
by asserting a deduction not claimed in his original return for that year
will run this risk if he has taken the deduction already for a year now
(Vol. 48. 509
SECTION 820 OF THE REVENUE ACT
closed. But neither this situation, nor the analogous ones which may
arise in basis cases or cases involving related taxpayers, can be thought
of as having any bearing upon willingness to return income and pay tax
correspondingly. Here, the corrective principle merely discourages the
double use of subtractions from gross income which may not legitimately
be used more than once. Second, a taxpayer who seeks a refund as to
an open year by asserting that an income item included in his original
return for that year really pertains to another year, now closed, will run
the risk of reopening if he omitted the item from his return for the closed
year. The analogous situation involving related taxpayers, in which a
claim of refund by A may, if successful, have the effect of laying B open
to a deficiency assessment, can raise a substantially identical problem if
A is under a legal obligation, or considers himself under a moral obliga-
tion, to reimburse or exonerate B. When, as will usually be the case, A's
responsibility is less than this, his reluctance to disclose the income item
will also be less marked. Hence we can do full justice to the contention
of the Committee report by discussing it in terms of a single taxpayer.
If a single taxpayer is not aware of the existence of Section 820, or
has no suspicion that any income item with which lie is dealing has been
improperly omitted from his return for some closed year, lie will of course
have no greater incentive to suppress this item than would exist if Section
820 had never been enacted. If he becomes certain, either with or without
legal advice, that the item pertains exclusively to a closed year, his con-
duct with or without Section 820 will be identical. Should he be an ex-
tremely sensitive man about income-tax liability, he will seek to correct
the outlawed return; should he be a normal person, he will do nothing
at all about disclosing the item. This statement must be understood as
implying absence of fraud in connection with the old return. Otherwise
that year will not be closed. If this hypothetical taxpayer, with or with-
out legal advice, becomes reasonably doubtful as to whether the item
pertains exclusively to a closed year, his natural action, entirely aside from
Section 820, will be to withhold the item from his current return, thus
paying no tax with respect to it unless the Bureau discovers the omission
and a deficiency assessment results. Should he be too honorable or too
timid to pursue this reticent course, it seems to us practically certain that
he will act no less openly with Section 820 in the statute than without
it. Let any lawxyer test the general soundness of tils analysis by consider-
ing what advice he would give a client who came to him with each of
the varying shadings of the problem. If the analysis is sound, this par-
ticular criticism by the Committee has been quite completely evaporated.
Just as the willingness of taxpayers to make voluntary payments is a
matter of the highest importance, so must it be essential to avoid profuse
tax litigation, in the achievement of really satisfactory administration.
One obvious shortcoming of the judicial "estoppel" remedy for the prob-
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lem under discussion is that its application has required incessant litiga-
tion. Dozens of estoppel cases have been decided one way or the other
during the past eight or ten years without attainment of anything like
reasonable certitude. When possible statutory methods of relief are can-
vassed, one prime consideration must be that of reducing litigated con-
troversy. The best way to cut down litigation is to abolish or lessen the
incentive to do the things which lay bases for law suits. The adverse
critics of Section 820 seem to assert that its fundamental theory tends
to increase this incentive, and that other fundamental theories are there-
fore preferable.
Of course the action which causes law suits in the present' connection
is the taking of inconsistent positions on either the government's or the
taxpayers' sides. Remedial theories which make inconsistency attractive
or at least harmless would be likely in practice to continue the recent dis-
putatious conditions. Remedial theories which make inconsistency im-
possible or costly would tend to change these conditions. Let us consider
the theories one by one in the light of this thesis:
1. The theory of recoupment or set-off. Under this it will be re-
membered that when an item is twice taxed, the erroneous tax paid for
the closed year is to be credited against the tax correctly exacted for the
open year. Correspondingly, where a deduction has been twice used, the
tax saving by its correct use for the open year is to be reduced by the
saving resulting from its erroneous use for the closed year." This process
produces a theoretically correct result only where the two taxes or the
two savings are exactly equal (taking into account an allowance for
39. This seems to enlist the support of Mr. Phillips, already quoted in note 23 supra,
although his terminology is different: "For myself, I believe that there is (a legislative
solution). There will not be time to permit an exposition of the full idea, but if my
memory serves me correctly, a draft of such an idea was proposed by Congre'.s ,ote
ten years ago. At that time it died because Congress did not have the time to complete
the draft in satisfactory form. The principle underlying that draft was one of equitable
estoppel, applying equally to the taxpayer and to the government, making an adjustment
in the open year which would correspond with the tax liability which was escaped, and
adjusting the open year with respect to the tax liability which might have been but was
not imposed during the closed year; at the same time not increasing the tax liability
beyond that which would be equitable under a proper adjustment of the liability as be-
tween both years. The idea is very difficult to work out." (1938) 16 TAX M,\i. at 694.
This reference seems to be to the proposal of Mr. Satterlee's committee in 1927, which
reads: "Provided, That whenever the commissioner determines an additional tax for a
taxable year, the effect of which determination is to decrease the tax for Some other
year or years, the refund or credit of which tax would be barred by limitation, stch
refund or credit, up to the amount of said additional tax, shall be allowed, notwithstand-
ing such limitation: And provided further, That whenever the commissioner reduees the
tax for a taxable year, the effect of which reduction is to increase the tax for some other
year or years, the assessment or collection of which additional tax would be barred by
limitation, such additional tax may be assessed and collected up to the amount of said
reduction, notwithstanding such limitation." Hearings, supra note 2, at 544; cf. 535
and 548.
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interest by reason of the time spread), or the tax or saving for the closed
year is smaller than the tax or saving for the open year. When the tax
or saving resulting from erroneous action for the closed year is larger
than the correct tax or saving, the Commissioner in the first instance and
the taxpayer in the second instance may retain the improper excess. In
other words, under this theory inconsistency never results in any loss with
respect to income-tax either to government or taxpayer. Since there is
always a chance that inconsistency will pass undetected, or unredressed
even to the limited extent permitted, the theory does not end the Com-
missioner's incentive to tax doubtfully-timed income tAvice or the tax-
payer's incentive to claim doubtfully-timed deductions twice. And so,
of course, in related taxpayer cases, where proprietorship instead of tim-
ing is the problem. Like any rule of "heads I win, tails we tie", the
recoupment theory does not tend to decrease litigation.
2. The theory of recoupment or set-off modified by an application of
the principle of Lewis v. Reynolds in favor of as well as against the tax-
payer, and with respect to deficiencies as well as refunds. Perhaps a
simpler way to state this theory is to say that the closed year shall be
completely reopened, the tax for that year recomputed so as to correct
all errors discoverable therein, and any relevant balance disclosed by this
computation used for recoupment. The balance may fall the wrong way
and, therefore, not be relevant. For example: For the year now closed
the taxpayer erroneously took advantage of a deduction, which saved
him $1,000; he also erroneously failed to claim another deduction, with
the net result that he overpaid his tax; for the open year he correctly, but
for a second time, claims the first deduction and saves $900 thereby; the
inconsistency is detected and a correction sought; but, because a net over-
payment (irrelevant for recoupment in the government's favor) appears
when the closed year is completely reaudited, the taxpayer reaps the full
benefit of his inconsistency. Suppose, to put things the other way around,
the Commissioner had erroneously compelled the taxpayer to include for
the closed year an income item which increased the tax $1,000; the Com-
missioner also erroneously failed to disallow a deduction for personal
(not business) expense which saved the taxpayer $1,500; and for the
open year the Commissioner correctly, but for the second time, insists
upon including the income item and thus increases the tax by $750. The
Commissioner, this time, will be able to reap the full benefit of his incon-
sistency, since the taxpayer cannot produce from the closed year a single
cent for recoupment. Under this theory there is a most dangerous in-
centive to inconsistency and litigation because so far as the Bureau can
dig out for use in connection with an open year an item of income sub-
jected to untimely taxation for a closed year, it can with respect to that
closed year at least partially resurrect tax liability as to erroneously omitted
income items. In the converse situation, the taxpayer has a like golden
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opportunity with respect to erroneously omitted deductions. Very likely
these possibilities were among the considerations which moved Hugh
Satterlee to say in 1927, when speaking to the Committee on Ways and
Means about our general problem, that the Committee on Federal Taxa-
tion of the American Bar Association did not "think that simply because
there is one change to be made in a return for a year, it should be given
the effect of opening up the return for the previous year wide open. "40
3. The theory of correct adjustment-that is, the theory of Section
820 -modified by a similar application of the principle of Lewis v.
Reynolds. Under such a scheme the possibilities are just as alarming as
under the scheme just described. Both these schemes obviously offer
strong incentives to inconsistency and litigation whenever with respect
to closed years ordinary erroneous omissions or inclusions can be revivified
in collateral consequence of an attack on the timing or proprietorship of
other items.
4. The theory which freezes the mistake permanently and which might
be termed the estoppel notion carried over into statute, made to work
both ways, and operated under less intricate requirements than those of
judicial estoppel in pais. In broad terms this means that a taxpayer who
takes the advantage of a deduction for one year under one theory of tim-
ing may not, after that year has closed, shift position and take advantage
of the same deduction for another year under another theory; correspond-
ingly, that the Commissioner, having accepted payment of tax with respect
to an income item, is similarly bound. Sweepingly and rigidly applied,
this discourages litigation with a vengeance by prohibiting inconsistency.
It would operate to the benefit of designing taxpayers who, avoiding fraud
and failure to file returns,41 chose the least expensive method of return
despite possible incorrectness, with a hope that the year might be closed
by limitations or otherwise before their method was questioned. Such an
application of the estoppel notion really makes the limitation period for
each year potentially a limitation period for some problems of other years.
As the other years will usually be later ones, the result is highly anomalous.
It demands vigilance and quickness of decision by the Bureau far beyond
what has hitherto been necessary and probably beyond what is possible
with the present personnel and scheme of administration. No such acute
celerity has been required of the government in connection with judicial
estoppels because these cannot be fastened upon the Treasury. The tax-
payer, too, may have good reason to complain of specially abbreviated
limitation periods. Suppose, for instance, that in compliance with exist-
ing judicial decision a deduction far exceeding gross income of 1935 is
40. Op. cit. supra note 2, at 535. Mr. Satterlee's remarks may, however, be read
simply as an expression of preference for recoupment or set-off as contrasted with thor-
oughgoing correct adjustment.
41. See Revenue Act of 1938, § 276(a), 26 U. S. C. § 276(a) (Supp. 1938).
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claimed as a business expense for that year. In 1940 the Supreme Court
reverses the earlier cases, and lays down the rule that such deductions
must be prorated over a series of years, these years running in our par-
ticular case through 1945. So prorated, the deduction would be more
valuable to the taxpayer than as applied in a lump to 1935. Yet, under
the estoppel or freezing rule, he will be told that as to past years still
generally open and even as to future years he may not have the benefit
of the Supreme Court's decision.'
5. The actual theory of Section 820, which is the theory of correct
adjustment is uncomplicated by the principle of Lewis v. Reynolds. This
rule, "by taking the profit out of inconsistency" 43 removes the incentive
of undue advantage which has obviously caused most inconsistency and
most litigation in the past, and has given rise to most discontent with the
old conditions. It does not further restrict the Treasury's opportunity
to detect and deal with income-tax returns in which items have been
manipulated for the purpose of reducing tax rather than of complying
with the law. At the same time, in cases such as the hypothetical situation
described at the end of the last paragraph, this rule does not prevent
matters from being completely straightened out. The American Bar Asso-
ciation's Committee complains because such readjustments are possible
even though the tax-payer has "negligently allowed the statute to expire
against him."4 If distinctions between the diligent and non-diligent were
easily and surely made, a differentiation might be worded and added to
the section. But of course such distinctions are neither easy nor certain
of application. Congress can hardly be blamed for establishing a broad
rule based on the view that it is wisest to permit the correction of clear
injustices, accepting the risk that some comparatively undeserving per-
sons may take advantage of the opening.
One further consideration should be touched upon with particular
reference to the foregoing paragraphs 4 and 5. The Supreme Court has
told us that it is a violation of due process to charge a husband with tax
liability for his wife's income, assuming that he has not in any fashion
42. The American Bar Association's Committee of 1933 seems to favor estoppel.
At least its report says that a statute of limitations "should be simple and understand-
able," and talks about "the simple estoppel solution which has been attempted by some
courts." Supra note 3, at 106. Contrast Paul (1933) 16 TAX MAG. at 694 ("I do vant to
emphasize the seriousness of the subject, and I don't believe that the cure can be effected
through the operation of the estoppel principle. I tried myself to deal with estoppel one
time and I ran into sixty or seventy pages on the subject, and I don't believe we are going
to be able to put that into a comprehensible statute.").
43. Report, supra note 37, at 49.
44. Supra note 3, at 105. Such insistence upon due care is strikingly at variance with
the Committee's implied insistence in the very next page that taxpayers owe the Govern-
ment no perceptible duty to be careful about taking identical deductions twice over. See
pp. 524, 525 .rupra.
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consented to being thus charged.45 For this reason it seems highly ques-
tionable whether the statutory estoppel .doctrine of paragraph 4 can be
invoked with respect to related taxpayers, except so far as there is a
special agency relationship between them, as in cases of collusion to defeat
the revenues, or when one of them is proprietor of the whole beneficial
interest involved, as in Stone v. White. It has been suggested that forced
application of the correct adjustment principle to related taxpayers would
also be unconstitutional.4" While the issue is not beyond doubt, we believe
this suggestion- unsound. Statutes of limitation may be modified and
amplified by particular exceptions, provided the modifications and excep-
tions are reasonable. The general notion of proper classification as not
violating equal protection is relevant here, although the Fifth Amend-
ment contains no explicit equal protection clause.4 7 Nor is it a violation
of due process to revive a remedy by legislation passed after the statute
of limitations has run against enforcement.48 So the application of the
correct adjustment principle with respect to related taxpayers for years
already past seems to present no peculiar difficulty. If these constitutional
views are correct, and (as we contend hereafter) it is desirable to extend
to related taxpayers whatever afneliorative doctrine Congress employs
for the immediate purpose, the correct adjustment rule seems in this
respect preferable to the statutory estoppel rule.
Our general conclusion on the problem of choosing one corrective prin-
ciple rather than another as a basis of legislation is that the correct
adjustment rule has perceptible theoretical and practical advantages over
the other possible rules, and that the criticisms leveled against it are not
convincing.
(This article will be concluded in the March issue.)
45. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206 (1931).
46. Air. Phillips raised the point. (1938) 16 TAx MAG. at 694.
47. Elaborate citation seems needless, but attention may be called to the Supreaie
Court's remarks about the classification involved in § 611 of the Revenue Act of 1928,
45 STAT. 875 (1928). Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U. S. 409, 431-432 (1931).
48. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620 (1885). See Graham & Foster v. Goodcell,
282 U. S. 409, 426-430, and particularly several of the antecedent cases in lowver Federal
courts,- such as Huntley v. Gile, 32 F. (2d) 857, 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) ; Regla Coal
Co. v. Bowers, 37 F. (2d) 373, 377 (S. D. N. Y., 1929), aff'd sub norn. Daniel Reeves,
Inc. v. Anderson, 43 F. (2d) 679, 682-683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Imhoff-Berg Silk Dyeing
Co. v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 836, 843 (D. N. J. 1930). Mascot Oil Co., Inc. v.
United States, 282 U. S. 434 (1931), and Helvering v. Newport Co., 291 U. S. 485 (1934),
should also be consulted. But contrast with these two cases the discussion in Commis-
sioner v. Northern Coal Co., 62 F. (2d) 742 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933), aff'd by equally dizided
court, per curiam, 290 U.S. 591 (1933), rehcaring denied, 293 U.S. 191 (1934) ; see
National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating Co., 226 U. S. 276, 282 et seq. (1912).
Cf. William Danzer & Co., Inc. v. Gulf & Ship Island R. R., 268 U. S. 633, 636-637 (1925) ;
Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U. S. 403, 416-417 (1935); Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281
U. S. 397, 409 (1930).
